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Welfare: Debates and Differences 
In this brief introductory chapter, I want to sketch some key concepts in 
welfare and talk about how I will use them. The central task of the chapter 
therefore is to frontload many of the ideas and concepts that are threaded 
throughout this book at the outset so that they make sense where they 
appear. It is not my intention to give a complete overview of welfare and 
welfare states as this has been done extensively elsewhere. However certain 
concepts are important enough to warrant an overview meaning that this 
chapter functions somewhat as of a detailed glossary of key terms.  
Welfare 
Ascribing meaning to the word welfare is hardly onerous when it is being 
used in the general sense as it is clearly concerned with the ideals of health, 
happiness and well-being, all inherently positive things that we would 
generally wish people to possess in abundance. However, I use the term 
welfare here in less general terms to refer, in the main, to social protection 
and what may also be referred to as social welfare or social assistance. When 
I am talking about welfare and the welfare state, I am in general talking 
about income maintenance as the suite of payments available in a welfare 
state for working-age recipients who may not be working or who may be 
unable to work. While used in a specialist sense, I deliberately want to use 
the word welfare in a positive manner as part of the act of reclaiming a word 
that has become contested and imbued with multiple meanings.  
In the post-war context, it can be suggested that the word welfare and the 
term welfare state have undergone a semantic vicissitude in the popular 
lexicon, essentially moving from being words once imbued with the 
positivity of collective solidarity to becoming words now largely used in the 
pejorative, as slurs and points of attack, in the context of social welfare at 





attributing the ideological origins of this paradigm shift to the American 
neoliberal paternalists (Murray, 1984, 1990, 1994; Mead, 1986, 1992) and 
communitarians (Etzioni, 1997; Selbourne, 1994) who separately advocated 
for the withdrawal of welfare state supports under the guise of promoting 
citizen self-reliance and disincentivising a culture of “dependency” (Gilbert, 
2009; Dwyer, 2016; Wright and Patrick, 2019). While these types of 
discourses may have been American in origin in respect to the latter half of 
the 20th century at least, they are undoubtedly much older than this, having 
a long history in European countries also (Fox-Piven and Cloward, 1993; 
Powell, 1992, 2017). In this book, I reject these negative discourses of 
welfare and ‘reclaim’ use of the word welfare in its most positive sense. 
This ‘reclaiming’ of the word welfare for use in a positive and, arguably, 
much more accurate way is a task that others have also taken up, notably 
Glennerster (2017, p. 4), who also acknowledges “a steady and deliberate 
attempt to devalue the English use of the word welfare to taint it with its 
American stigma” and who, as a result, similarly makes use of the word 
welfare in its most positive sense, thus disrupting what have become 
commonplace or common-sense understandings that help frame a negative 
welfare consensus (Jensen and Tyler, 2015; Patrick, 2017).  
Welfare states 
Defining what is meant by a welfare state means entering a contested space 
on at least two fronts. What a welfare state is and what a welfare state does 
in terms of what could be included in a definition are both contested areas. 
I do not intend to muddy the waters further here and I will therefore stick to 
a simple conception of a welfare state as a state that takes some formal 
responsibility for the well-being of its populace. This conscious undertaking 
is usually then manifested in things like health, housing, education and, of 
course, income maintenance (the latter is the general area of interest here). 
However, I want to stress that this should not be taken to imply some sort 
of unilateral beneficence on the part of governments. Rather, governments 
and society, in general, are the mutual beneficiaries of a healthy, well-
educated and secure populace and therefore a welfare state is arguably 
something to aspire to.  
In a practical sense, there are also different models of welfare states and this 
is a factor I want to draw attention to briefly. For simplicity, and to utilise 
the seminal work of Esping-Andersen (1990), it may be helpful to set out 





 A conservative or corporatist model: Strongly based on the 
concept of social insurance, also known as contributory payment 
schemes; 
 A liberal or residual model: Strongly based on social assistance 
type payments, also known as non-contributory schemes; and 
 A social democratic or universal model: Strongly based on 
universal or non-means-tested payments. 
 
In reality, things are seldom this simple and most welfare states have some 
of the features of all three types described above. Nevertheless, Britain and 
Ireland, along with perhaps Australia, Canada and the United States, do 
generally tend to be referred to as liberal or residual welfare states. Nordic 
countries such as Norway, Sweden and Demark and generally referred to as 
universal or social democratic welfare states and Germany would be an 
example of a country that has traditionally favoured a corporatist regime.  
This task of modelling welfare state types, particularly in Europe, features 
most notably in the work of Esping-Andersen (1990) in his seminal book 
entitled Three worlds of welfare capitalism. It has since been built on by 
large level institutional work concerning welfare attitudes across jurisdictions 
by authors like Larsen (2006) and Wendt, Mischke and Pfeifer (2011). For 
its part, the work of Larsen convincingly shows that particular types of 
welfare state models can produce particular types of attitudes towards 
deservingness and produce particular levels of stigma ultimately producing 
particular experience types. Simply put, this rests on the assertion, 
illustrated here by Dukelow and Considine (2017, p. 195) that: 
While social security may be represented as quite a technical system of 
finance, it is underpinned by competing ideological traditions and values, 
which have different views of the system and its purpose.  
Following Dukelow and Considine (2017), this book suggests that the 
modern welfare state is underpinned by and reflective of particular notions 
of social deservingness that rely on particular logics of poorness and poverty 
that are likely to be historically mediated.  
Poor relief 
Much of this text is spent looking at deep historical concepts and practices. 
This means that while the object of inquiry consistently remains social 
deservingness in respect to the poor and impoverished, the nomenclature 





contemporary discourse, we encounter welfare where in historical parlance 
we would have encountered ‘poor relief’. This is a shift in semantics rather 
than in object. Social welfare, social assistance or social protection, are all 
essentially modern terms for the concept of poor relief and the provision of 
welfare is the modern equivalent for the practice of relieving the poor. Were 
it not so, that is if there were no poor to relieve, there would be no need for 
welfare, whatever we may call it. Nevertheless, where the term poor relief 
is used here and where it is generally to be found in use throughout the 
literature it does refer to historical concepts and practices. 
Measuring deservingness 
In modern welfare states, deservingness is generally neither decided upon 
arbitrarily nor fully as an act of discretion (see Ryan and Power, 2020; 
Ranerup and Henriksen, 2020 for discussions on the concept of discretion 
and decision making). Rather, who gets what and what they should have to 
do in order to get it is decided through complex welfare processes that 
involve various calculations in respect to things like means, work history, 
previous or existing claims and so on. Welfare states are also underpinned 
by complex processes of taxation (Byrne and Ruane, 2017). Distilling this 
down further and focusing on how deservingness, in particular, is decided 
within and by the welfare state, a claimant’s worthiness is often mediated 
by a process known as the ‘means test’. This in turn reveals one of the core 
and continuing debates concerning the administration of differing forms of 
social policy in respect to the nature of the benefit given along with the 
means of deciding who gets what. The principal dichotomy lies between 
administering selective benefits and universal ones. In administering 
selective benefits, common in what may be termed liberal or residual 
welfare regimes, resources are targeted, using pre-determined thresholds or 
cut-off points, only at those deemed most in need on the basis that this is 
both cost-effective and fair (Dukelow and Considine, 2017; Glennerster, 
2017). In administering universal benefits, common in what may be referred 
to as institutional welfare regimes, benefit is conferred as a matter of right 
and/or of citizenship. In residual or more selective regimes, the core tool for 
deciding eligibility is the ‘means test’ (Dukelow and Considine, 2017; 
Glennerster, 2017).  
There has been an abundance of scholarship in this area and on the effects 
of both universal and selective regimes, in terms of the impacts these 
processes can have on claimants which are ultimately contested. However, 
for simplicity, at its most straightforward the argument is that selective, 





means-tested benefits are not or are at least less so (Titmuss, 1987). It is 
perhaps more nuanced than this in reality and it should be noted that the 
concept of either a purely residual or indeed purely institutional welfare 
regime is more reflective of two opposite poles on a continuum rather than 
an existing reality, with most welfare states combining elements of both 
even when favouring one over the other (Esping-Andersen, 1990). 
Nevertheless, when considering deservingness in the context of welfare, 
such a continuum is instructive.  
A review of the post-war scholarship in respect to selectivity, or residualism, 
versus universalism, leads us to Richard Titmuss (1968, p. 134), who was 
undoubtedly a strong voice in favour of a publicly funded universalist 
approach and an equally strong critic of selectivist means-tested approaches. 
He sums this up here in the following terms.  
If all services are provided – irrespective of whether they represent benefits, 
amenity, social protection or compensation – on a discriminatory, means-
tested basis, do we not foster both the sense of failure and the stigma of 
public burden? The fundamental objective of all such tests of eligibility is to 
keep people out; not to let them in. 
So then, following Titmuss here, it is suggested that the technical processes 
involved in testing the means of welfare claimants in contemporary welfare 
states are, in effect, one aspect of the actualisation of the parameters of 
social deservingness within an administrative context. They represent social 
deservingness in action, and they were foreshadowed in early poor relief by 
things like less eligibility and the workhouse test, each of which we will 
come to look at in paragraphs further on. In respect to social deservingness, 
the process of means-testing answers the ‘who’ question in who deserves to 
get what and what they should have to do in order to get it. We turn next to 
the ‘what’.  
Welfare conditionality 
Conditionality has arguably always been part of formalised welfare regimes 
dating at least as far back as the poor laws and the condition of less eligibility 
(Dukelow and Considine, 2017; Powell, 1992, 2017). Nevertheless, in terms of 
structured formalisation, there has arguably been a more pronounced turn 
towards welfare conditionality in the latter part of the 20th and beginning of 
the 21st centuries (Whelan, 2020a, 2020b, 2021). Conditionality is often 
designed as a means of promoting re-entry to the workforce for those 





portion of social deservingness in the question of who deserves to get what 
and what they should have to do in order to get it.  
In defining what is meant by welfare conditionality, the following 
definition, taken from the Welfare Conditionality (2019, p. 8) final findings 
report provides a useful starting point: 
Welfare conditionality links eligibility for collectively provided welfare 
benefits and services to recipients’ specified compulsory responsibilities or 
particular patterns of behaviour. It has been a key element of welfare state 
reform in many nations since the mid-1990s. 
Here the concept of eligibility is linked to specified responsibilities and 
patterns of behaviour and this essentially captures the inherent nature of 
welfare conditionality. However, building on this definition it can also be 
argued that many aspects of welfare conditionality are simply ‘expected’ 
without necessarily being explicitly or overtly specified, constituting the 
mundane reality of life in the welfare space. There are also, arguably, hidden 
or at least less well-known areas of conditionality that may only become 
apparent when the boundaries that they set down are contravened (Watts 
and Fitzpatrick, 2018; Whelan, 2020a, 2021). Conditionality then is the 
‘where you must go and what you must do’ element of social deservingness.  
Stigmatised deservingness  
It would be simplistic to think that once the ‘who’ and ‘what’ have been 
decided that somehow social deservingness exists in a pure form, free from 
scrutiny, suspicion or public derision. I, therefore, want to bring the who 
and what questions that are formally arbitrated within welfare states forward 
here and by doing so, introduce a more specifically social element. The 
concept of social stigma then is instructive here as it arguably has a very 
direct relationship with notions of social deservingness in that it acts to 
temper social deservingness. It is also useful here as a means of distinguishing 
between legal-rational types of deservingness and specifically social 
deservingness on the basis that just because deservingness has been decided 
legally or formally, that does not mean it is accepted socially. There is a 
burden to social deservingness then that Titmuss (1968) described as the 
“stigma of public burden” in the context of welfare which, in the end, could 
be said to constitute an “ungenerous gift” (Boland and Griffin, 2016).  
There can be little doubt that any thorough discussion of stigma will, at the 
very least, allude to the work of Goffman (1990a, 1990b) and I will do so 





I do want to unpack it briefly to offer a context to the idea of stigmatised 
deservingness spoken about above. The Goffmanian thesis of stigma begins 
with a discussion on the historical origins of stigma; Goffman (1990a, p. 11) 
evokes the Greeks who enacted stigma through purposely imposed 
...bodily signs...that were...burnt into the body and advertised that the bearer 
was a slave, a criminal or a traitor—a blemished person, ritually polluted, to 
be avoided, especially in public places. 
Here, stigma works as a form of explicit ‘othering’ and is recognised by 
being displayed in inherently physical ways, though perhaps with obvious 
psychological repercussions for the bearer also. However, the historical 
propensity for such practices is also noted by Scambler (2018, p. 55) who 
suggests that there may have been an economic, as well as social impetus 
behind them: 
The mark literally scarred into the flesh of Attican and Athenian slaves 
‘othered’…[s]laves were valuable assets and their branding – the mark was 
called a ‘stigma’ – minimised the risk of escape.  
So then, the physical ascription of a stigma in the form of a “mark scarred 
into the flesh” saw the slave as an asset marked for the purpose of protecting 
a valuable investment. This practice of those higher up the economic ladder 
marking out those below them for economic purposes would repeat 
throughout history, ultimately taking different forms. In respect to welfare 
and logics of poorness and poverty, the badging of the poor in early modern 
England provides a further example of marking persons out for economic 
purposes. In the context of deservingness, this practice, the enforced 
wearing of a badge, literally separated the deserving from the undeserving. 
Hindle (2004, p. 10) talks about the importance of this here: 
The shame of pauperization received its ultimate symbolic representation in 
the badging of the poor under the statute of 1697. This was, potentially, not 
only a critical episode in the history of poverty and poor relief, but also 
arguably the single most decisive moment in the creation of social identity 
in early modern England. The act ordered that all poor persons receiving 
parish relief must wear a badge in red or blue cloth on the shoulder of the 
right sleeve in an open and visible manner. Any parish officer who dispensed 
relief to a poor person not wearing a badge could be fined 20s. for each 
disbursement, and any pauper who refused the badge was either to have their 
relief withdrawn or to be whipped and committed to bridewell for three 
weeks’ hard labour. In requiring that the wives and children of parish 
paupers also wear the badge, moreover, the act powerfully insisted upon the 





parents who lacked the moral compass to inculcate habits of industry and 
discipline in their offspring. 
It is clear then that the ascription of stigma in historical contexts was 
complex. For Goffman (1990a) it appears to have been about identifying 
“the ritually polluted”, those persons that others should generally avoid. The 
mark in this instance is not the stigma, rather it is indicative of the stigma, 
the impact of which was to ‘other’ the bearer. However, there were clearly 
also economic reasons for marking persons out, as noted by Scrambler 
(2018) and by Tyler in more recent work. Tyler (2018, 2020), in particular, 
has contributed one of the most meaningful critiques of the Goffmanian 
thesis of stigma to emerge in recent years and in doing so has gone some 
way towards reconceptualising stigma as a useful concept for sociology. In 
doing so, Tyler (2018, 2020) questions the fundamental basis of the 
Goffmanian thesis.  
A further criticism, and one made specifically in the context of social policy, 
comes by way of Titmuss (1974, p. 45) who suggests that:  
The trouble…with Goffman and many other American writers on the subject 
of ‘stigma’ and social policy is that they are extraordinarily parochial. They 
generalise and develop sophisticated theories on the basis of American 
values and mythologies about independence, work, thrift, private enterprise, 
the self-made man…  
This assertion by Titmuss (1974) at once critiques Goffman and others 
while still acknowledging the importance of stigma as a concept for social 
policy. Pinker (1971, p. 175), writing in the context of social policy, has 
also noted that importance and relevance of stigma by stating that “The 
imposition of stigma is the commonest form of violence used in democratic 
societies.”  
This powerful statement denotes an acceptance on the part of Pinker (1971) 
as to the implicit existence of stigma in the context of social policy and, in 
speaking of an “imposition”, also suggests a sense of purposefulness on the 
part of those tasked with developing policy in this area (Page, 1984). For 
our purposes, it suggests that as a form of symbolic violence in the contexts 
of welfare, poverty and poor relief, stigma impacts by delegitimising and 
tainting social deservingness through the “stigma of public burden” 
(Titmuss, 1974) and through the imposition of shame. At an experiential 
level, stigma, where it is realised, can often, though perhaps not always, 
produce shame, which is, as Fischer (2018) points out, “notoriously, a 





pronounced for being mediated through normative ideas concerning 
goodness and good citizenship (Whelan, 2020b; Schefer and Munt, 2019; 
Scheff, 2006). The fact that such notions have a distinct social dimension 
shows us how stigma is realised, as Pinker has denoted, as a form of 
violence in the contexts of both modern welfare and historical poor relief 
and in the broader sociology of sociality, thus impacting widespread notions 
of social deservingness.  
If we include this analysis in the broader analysis of who should get what 
and what they should have to do in order to get it, we may say that once 
welfare states have decided on who should get what and on what the 
conditions are for legitimate receipt, social stigma continues to evoke and 
temper notions of social deservingness through a process of symbolic 
violence manifesting in shame. Graphically, it can be represented as 
follows: 
 















Effectively, what I am arguing here then is that there are two aspects to 
deservingness in the context of welfare and poor relief that operate on 
formal and informal levels. Formal deservingness is decided in and through 
welfare states via the who and what processes represented by means-testing 
and conditionalities. This is a formal, legal and legitimate type of deservingness, 
though arriving at it can be an inherently stigmatising process (Whelan, 
2020a, 2020b, 2021). Once the receipt of welfare or relief has been realised 
as a legal recognition of deservingness, that deservingness takes on a social 
form, becoming stigmatised deservingness, affected by the symbolic 
violence that stigma implies and, to use Scambler’s (2018) phrase, “heaping 
shame upon blame” in a way that is reflective of ‘common sense’ logics of 
poorness and poverty (Jensen and Tyler, 2015; Nielsen, 2021). This socially 
constituted form of deservingness in the context of welfare and poor relief 
is then actualised by the type of “moral coerciveness” warned against by 
John Stuart Mill (1991/1859, p. 8) as far back as 1859, which, in light of the 
fact that it so eloquently captures the sentiment of what is being 
communicated here, is worth quoting in full: 
Society can and does execute its own mandates: and if it issues wrong 
mandates instead of right, or any mandates at all in things with which it 
ought not to meddle, it practises a social tyranny more formidable than many 
kinds of political oppression, since, though not usually upheld by such 
extreme penalties, it leaves fewer means of escape, penetrating much more 
deeply into the details of life and enslaving the soul itself.  
The burden of stigmatised deservingness then lies heavy on those who must 
bear it, it penetrates deeply into their lives and enslaves their soul. In the 
chapters to follow we begin the task of examining the concept of social 
deservingness by illustrating how it has been historically discoursed by a 
broad range of thinkers through a long period of history. If, as is proposed 
here, welfare states are a particular and overt expression of social and 
collective notions of deservingness, the concept of deservingness itself is a 
much older proposition and one which has been discussed in various ways 
by various important thinkers and in the context of various schools of 
philosophy and thought. Indeed, debates that straddle the fault line that runs 
between deserving and undeserving are arguably ancient in the human sense 
and certainly in the sense of social humanity. If Hegel’s assertion that 
Socrates awoke, within the ancient Greeks, a sense of individuality and the 
consciousness needed to question what is good and what is bad, then we 
must at least go this far back. Undoubtedly, in the idiom of human welfare 
and the collective organisation thereof, debates surrounding deservingness, 





order to get it, have been omnipresent, taking in discourses surrounding 
sturdy beggars, the able-bodied and impotent poor, up to and including 
formalisation via the workhouse test and its direct descendant the means 
test.  
The plan for the chapters to follow is to track notions of deservingness by 
exploring how such notions have been treated by various major thinkers and 
schools of thought, primarily in the western philosophic tradition and across 
centuries of discourse. It should be said at the outset that though the work 
in these pages bears some of the hallmarks of the genealogical approach, I 
do not claim that it represents a thorough genealogy of deservingness as this 
would require at least twice again the pages committed to this book. Rather, 
the purpose is to give context by transmitting a sense of what social 
deservingness means, how it has been discoursed and how it is ultimately 
fixed in some respects and malleable in others, as evidenced by changing 
ideas over time. In this respect, a starting point is needed, and a degree of 
selectivity is also required; this inevitably means that much is necessarily 
left out. With this caveat in mind, the following chapters will still focus on 
specific and arguably important historical periods. A start is made by 
looking at classical Athens and the Graeco-Roman period thus taking-in 
Plato and Aristotle with respect to the former, along with the philosophies 
of Epicureanism and Stoicism in the case of the latter. From here, early 
Christianity will be considered and therefore the works of Augustine and 
Aquinas along with the person of St Francis will be explored. Moving from 
early Christianity to the Protestant Reformation represents a natural bridge 
and so the writings of Luther and Calvin will be investigated; this particular 
juncture in the book also briefly takes in the Northern Renaissance. 
Following this, the focus will shift more to individual thinkers taking in the 
absolutism of Thomas Hobbes and the early liberalism of John Locke before 
seeking to include some more radical voices in the persons of Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau, Thomas Paine and Karl Marx. Next, the work of some classical 
political economists in the persons of Adam Smith, David Ricardo and 
Thomas Malthus will be examined along with the processes and practices 
of early poor relief. Finally, I will show briefly how the logics of poorness, 
poverty and deservingness sketched throughout the book are alive and 
practised in contemporary welfare states by offering a brief synthesis of 
contemporary literature.  
When dealing with historical figures, it should be noted that not all of these 
authors have addressed deservingness in the context of welfare in a direct 
way and therefore, an interpretation of their words is necessary. With that 





topics from how we are to how we should be and what we should do, to how 
society should be organised. Therefore, while interpretation may be 
necessary it is not stretched or forced in any way. Indeed, the words of those 
under consideration are placed at the forefront of the analysis here where 
this is possible. Ultimately, identifying continuity and change in respect to 
deservingness forms a major task for this book. Essentially, however, the 
book will both argue and show that deservingness as a concept in the context 
of welfare almost always ends up devolving on the same set of fundamental 
arguments. The first of these is that across the centuries, who deserves to 
get what is almost always decided by those who have the most: it therefore 






more restrictive, residual and stigmatised forms of welfare provision and 
cognate ideas about deservingness.  
Plato and Aristotle: Radical departures  
and the rule of the mean 
What then of the philosophic discourses of classical Athens? Here I want to 
concentrate briefly on the words of Plato (427-347 BC) and Aristotle (384-
322 BC). There are of course others from this period and from the pre-
Socratic period who may have a significant bearing on a discussion on the 
concept of deservingness. However, Plato and Aristotle are chosen as they 
remain active in the public consciousness and imagination. Aristotle in 
particular has had an enormous impact on the subsequent two thousand 
years or so of thought and so represents a natural starting point (Russell, 
1946/1996). Moreover, Plato and Aristotle, along with Socrates tend always 
to be linked or sequenced which is not surprising given that Plato was a 
student of Socrates and Aristotle would go on to be a student of Plato, 
remaining at his academy for 20 years or so (Russell, 1946/2004). In the 
following paragraphs, I am going to focus on Plato and Aristotle together 
rather than separately on the basis that their vast differences in broad 
political philosophising coupled with their essential similarity in respect to 
how they treat matters of deservingness concerning the poor beget an 
interesting and somewhat jarring juxtaposition.  
Plato’s most famous and most complete work, at least in respect to the 
concept of society, is undoubtedly The Republic (375BC/2000). In many 
ways, The Republic remains a literary triumph. Presented in the form of a 
Socratic dialogue, in it, Plato essentially rejects participatory democracy 
and the rights of the individual on the basis that the state must and should 
be placed above the individual in order to foster stability, order and justice. 
This was a radical tract at the time it was written and remains so now, 
bordering as it does on a type of communistic utopia, culminating in the 
form of Kallipolis, the like of which has much in common with a politics of 
radicalism. Coupled with this, however, is a deeply conservative treatise 
that promotes the idea of a hereditary ruling class, an excluded working 
class and a remaining slave class. Whatever one may make of The Republic 
now, what Plato presents is notable in that his views are extreme and 
undoubtedly strive toward something new and different. Aristotle, on the 
other hand, departs from his old master and follows the ‘rule of the mean’ 
which essentially decries any form of extremism. In doing so he rejects 
much of what his old master suggests.  
